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RECENT DECISIONS
CRIMINAL LAW-PARTNERSHIPS-CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY OF A
PARTNER WHO MISAPPROPRIATES PARTNERSHIP PROPERTY.
State v. Peterson (La. 1957).
The defendant was charged with the theft of $7,000 from the Baton
Rouge Millworks of which he was a partner. A motion to quash the in-
formation was filed by the defendant averring in substance that since he
was a partner and no accounting had ever been made, there was no com-
mission of a crime. The trial court sustained the motion to quash the in-
formation and the state appealed. A Louisiana statute provides that theft
is the misappropriation or taking of anything of value which belongs to
another without the consent of the other, by means of fraudulent conduct,
practices, or representations.' The Supreme Court of Louisiana with two
justices dissenting, affirmed the decision of the trial court. The court held
that although a partnership is considered a legal entity in Louisiana, yet
if a man can be held liable in solido for the entire debt of a commercial
partnership of which he is a member, the commercial partnership cannot
be classed "another" apart from himself. The court also held that unless
an act can be brought within the meaning of the words of the statute, it is
not a crime though it comes within the mischief sought to be remedied by
the statute. The injured member of the partnership may still bring an
action for an accounting and dissolution of the partnership and thus is not
left without a remedy. State v. Peterson, 95 So. 2d 608 (La. 1957).2
Generally it has been held that a partner is not criminally liable for
larceny, embezzlement, or false pretenses for misappropriation of firm
property in which he has an ownership interest.3 This rule is based on the
common law doctrine that a partner is the owner of an undivided interest
in all the partnership property and thus cannot criminally convert his own
property. 4 Furthermore, the statutes dealing with larceny and other crim-
1. LA. REV. STAT. § 14:67 (1950).
2. State v. Peterson, 95 So.2d 608 (La. 1957).
3. Ex parte Sanders, 23 Ariz. 20, 201 Pac. 93 (1921) ; State v. Quinn, 245 Iowa 846,
64 N.W.2d 323 (1954) ; Laine v. Commonwealth, 287 Ky. 134, 151 S.W.2d 1055 (1941) ;
State v. Hogg, 126 La. 1053, 53 So. 225 (1910) ; State v. Ossendorf, 208 S.W.2d 209(Miss. 1948) ; State v. Elsbury, 63 Nev. 463, 175 P.2d 430 (1946) ; McCrary v. State,
51 Tex. Crim. 496, 103 S.W. 926 (1907). See also 2 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW §§ 1162,
1264, 1282 (12th ed. 1932).
4. Ex parte Sanders, 23 Ariz. 20, 201 Pac. 93 (1921) ; State v. Quinn, 245 Iowa
846, 64 N.W.2d 323 (1954) ; State v. Brown, 38 Mont. 309, 99 Pac. 954 (1909) ; State
v. Reddick, 2 S.D. 124, 48 N.W. 846 (1891) ; State v. Eberhart, 106 Wash. 222, 179
Pac. 853 (1919).
(215)
1
Editors: Recent Decisions
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1958
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
inal offenses require that the property taken be that of "another." 5 Follow-
ing these same principles it has been held that a statute which provides
that it shall be no defense to a prosecution for larceny that the property
appropriated was partly the property of another and partly the property of
the accused is not applicable to a partner who has wrongfully appropriated
partnership property to his own use." Statutes have been, enacted in many
states explicitly imposing criminal liability on a partner for the misappro-
priation of partnership property.7  However, where the agreement of part-
nership is executory and conditional, and one of the contracting parties
converts funds contributed by the other to the proposed firm, he may be
convicted of larceny or false pretenses." Also, a partner who undertakes
to wind up the partnership business after dissolution may be convicted of
embezzlement or larceny if he converts the firm's assets to his own use.,
In order to impose criminal liability upon the partner who misappro-
priates partnership property, in the absence of specific statute, it would be
necessary to consider the partnership as an entity apart from its members.
This adoption of a "legal fiction" would be permissible if necessary to
promote justice.' 0 Although the Uniform Partnership Act professedly has
adopted the aggregate theory of ownership of partnership property," courts
still hold the partnership to be a legal entity for certain purposes. 12  This
5. ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 38 § 387 (Smith-Hurd 1954); N.Y. PEN. LAW § 1290; TEx.
PEN. CoOS art. 1410 (1954). See also Commonwealth v. Novick, 248 Mass. 317, 142
N.E. 771 (1924) ; State v. Elsbury, 63 Nev. 463, 175 P.2d 430 (1946). ,
6. State v. Elsbury, 63 Nev. 463, 175 P.2d 430 (1946) ; State v. Eberhart, 106
Wash. 222, 179 Pac. 853 (1919). Contra, State v. MacGreyor, 202 Minn. 579, 279 N.W.
372 (1938). This case held that under such a statute a partner may be guilty of larceny
or embezzlement or misappropriation of partnership funds, since he is a person author-
ized by agreement to hold control of the partnership funds and it is no defense that he
is part owner.
7. FLA. STAT. § 811.021 (b) (1955) ; N.C. G8N. STAT. § 14-97 (1951) ; PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18 § 4835 (Supp. 1956) ; WIs. STAT. § 343.20 (2) (Supp. 1953).
"This subsection removes any doubt as to liability of a partner or tenant-in-common
or co-owner of a joint bank account for stealing from the other parties who share an
interest in the same property. At common law, and still in some states, convictions are
prevented by the conception that each of the joint owners has complete title to the
jointly owned property, so that he cannot misappropriate what already belongs to him.
Whatever the merits of such notions in the civil law, it is clear that they have no
relevance to the criminal laws effort to deter deprivation of other people's economic
interest." MODEL PENAL CODE § 206.1 (4).
8. Where creation of a partnership was contemplated and funds were contributed
as a direct result of false representations relied on by the complaining witness, misuse
of such funds was held to be sufficient for a conviction of false pretenses. State v. Foot,
100 Mont. 33, 48 P.2d 113 (1935). See also State v. Brown, 38 Mont. 309, 99 Pac. 954
(1909).
9. State v. Matthews, 129 Ind. 281, 28 N.E. 703 (1891) ; See Phelps v. State, 109
Ga. 115, 34 S.E. 210 (1899) ; Sharpe v. Johnston, 59 Mo. 557 (1875).
10. See Lewis, The Uniform Partnership Act-A Reply to Mr. Crane's Criticism,
29 HARV. L. Riv. 158, 162 (1915).
11. See Commissioner v. Whitney, 169 F.2d 562 (2d Cir. 1948); Rossmoore v.
Commissioner, 76 F.2d 520 (2d Cir. 1935) ; Lewis, The Uniform Partnership Act, 24
YALE L. J. 617 (1915).
12. Williams Bros. Lumber Co. v. Anderson, 210 Ga. 198, 78 S.E.2d 612 (1953);
State v. Pielsicker, 118 Neb. 419, 225 N.W. 51 (1929) ; X-L Liquors Inc. v. Taylor,
17 N.J. 444, 111 A.2d 753 (1955).
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has been done in cases of bankruptcy,'8 to allow bank directors in partner-
ship to borrow money from a bank,14 to determine liability under an in-
surance policy, 15 to establish a partner's agency to the partnership,, to
prohibit a personal judgment against a partner for a debt of a going part-
nership,' 7 and for contribution from the partnership as a joint tort-feasor.'5
If a partnership may be considered as a legal entity or unit for such pur-
poses, it would not be over extending it to apply this theory to the case of
a partner who has misappropriated partnership property. The statutes re-
quiring that the goods taken be those of "another" would be satisfied and
a partner could be held criminally responsible for misappropriation of the
firm's assets. Furthermore, if the partnership be considered a separate
legal entity, a partner may be its servant and thus be criminally liable for
the theft of partnership goods.19 In Louisiana under the civil law, the
partnership is regarded as a legal entity 20 and it is difficult to perceive
why the court did not so consider it in this case. The civil liability of the
partner does not afford a sufficient reason for not applying the entity theory
to criminal cases. The purpose of the statutes defining larceny, embezzle-
ment, and other kindred offenses is for the benefit and protection of society.
The civil liability is irrelevant to the social debt that a misappropriating
partner owes. The larcenous partner should not escape criminal liability
on a legal technicality or because of a slavish devotion to a concept.
Edward H. Feege
EVIDENCE-BEST EVIDENCE RULE-ADMISSIBILITY
OF A CARBON COPY AS PRIMARY EVIDENCE.
Chrismer v. Chrismer (Ohio Ct. App. 1956).
Plaintiffs, husband and wife, brought an action against the executor
of the estate of the husband's deceased father to recover on a promissory
note made by the deceased in 1951, payable to plaintiffs for services ren-
dered between 1936 and 1942. The husband testified that the note was
13. Liberty Nat. Bank v. Bear, 276 U.S. 215 (1928) ; In matter of Ginsberg, 219
F.2d 472 (2d Cir. 1955).
14. State v. Pielsicker, 118 Neb. 419, 225 N.W. 51 (1929).
15. Oklahoma Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mouse, 268 P.2d 886 (Okla. 1954).
16. Caswell v. Maplewood Garage, 84 N.H. 241, 149 Atl. 746 (1930).
17. Southard v. Oil Equipment Corp., 296 P.2d 780 (Okla. 1956).
18. Williams Bros. Lumber Co. v. Anderson, 210 Ga. 198, 178 S.E.2d 612 (1953).
19. See State v. Sasso, 20 N.J. Super. 158, 89 A.2d 489 (1952).
20. Trappey v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 229 La. 632, 86 So.2d 515 (1956);
Smith v. McMicken, 3 La. Ann. 319 (1924) ; Succession of Pilcher, 39 La. Ann. 362,
1 So. 929 (1887).
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executed in duplicate at the suggestion of the father by the use of carbon
paper, and that it was written out by the son and signed by the father
who retained the original. Defendant objected to the introduction of the
note on the ground that it was a carbon copy and that plaintiff failed to lay
a proper foundation for its introduction under the best evidence rule.
Plaintiffs contended that the instrument was a duplicate original and that
its admission in evidence did not violate the best evidence rule. The trial
court first admitted the note in evidence over defendant's objection. Then,
at the close of all the evidence, the court granted defendant's motion for
dismissal ruling that a carbon copy could not operate as a negotiable in-
strument 1 and that as a non-negotiable instrument it was inadmissible under
the best evidence rule without first laying a foundation. The appellate
court reversed and remanded the cause for a new trial, holding that although
the note was not a negotiable instrument and hence not admissible as a non-
negotiable instrument without first laying a foundation for its introduction,
the plaintiffs had been denied the opportunity to lay that foundation by the
trial court's reversal on the ruling of admissibility. Chrismer v. Chrismer,
144 N.E.2d 494 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956).2
The question of what constitutes an original writing for the purposes
of the best evidence rule has not been uniformly answered by courts. 3
In the past, reproductions of an original writing, such as letter-press copies,
have not been admitted without first laying a foundation, because they
were considered unreliable 4 due to the possibility of error in the copying
process. With the advent of invoicing machines which produce multiple
copies by a single impression, the several copies so produced were held
to be originals, equally admissible.5 Within this principle, a carbon im-
pression produced by typewriter or hand has sometimes been admitted under
the theory that it may be regarded as a duplicate original, since executed
contemporaneously with the original by a single stroke of the pen. 6 Alter-
natively, it has been suggested that some writings, which are by nature
copies and not originals at all, so reliably reproduce the content of the
originals that they may safely be used interchangeably with the originals
1. See OHio GEN. CODE ANN. §§8106, 8123, 8129 (Page Supp. 1953), which in
general states what constitutes a negotiable instrument.
2. Chrismer v. Chrismer, 144 N.E.2d 494 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956).
3. See 4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1232 (3d ed. 1940).
4. Anglo-American Packing & Provision Co. v. Cannon, 31 Fed. 313 (C.C.S.D.
Ga. 1887) ; Spottiswood v.. Weir, 66 Cal. 525, 6 Pac. 381 (1885) ; see 4 WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 1234 n.2 (3d ed. 1940). The letter-press process involves the recopying
of the original on specially prepared paper from which additional copies are then
reproduced by contact.
5. Federal Union Surety Co. v. Indiana Lumber & Manufacturing Co., 176
Ind. 328, 95 N.E. 1104 (1911).
6. Lewis v. Phillips-Boyd Publishing Co., 18 Ga. App. 181, 89 S.E. 177 (1916)
International Harvester Co. v. Elfstrom, 101 Minn. 263, 112 N.W. 252 (1907)
Hay v. American Fire Clay Co., 179 Mo. App. 567, 162 S.W. 666 (1913) ; Maston
v. Glen Lumber Co., 65 Okla. 80, 163 Pac. 128 (1917). See also MCCORMICK, Evi-
DENCE § 206 (1954).
[VOL. 3.
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for the purpose of proving content, without the necessity for considering
them duplicate originals.7
The basis for the best evidence rule is that a writing is itself the most
reliable evidence of its own contents, and therefore, its production is to be
preferred to that of a copy.8 If there is a sufficient reason why the writing
itself cannot be produced, a copy becomes admissible. 9 The theoretical
sacrifice in reliability gives way to exigency. The view that a carbon copy
may be admitted equally with the original in proving the content of a writ-
ing is premised on the reliability of a carbon copy as an accurate reproduc-
tion justifying such interchange.1 In determining the sufficiency of this
reliability, both inherent mechanical accuracy and faithful execution need
to be considered in the light of the adaptability of carbon copying to fraud
and imposition,"' the prevention of which has been said to be one of the
reasons for the best evidence rule.12  If the circumstances surrounding the
execution of the writing present more than a remote possibility of fraud,
the reliability of a carbon copy as an accurate reproduction may be impaired
and in consequence may not warrant its admission as primary evidence. 13
The facts of the present case present a cogent example of such circum-
stances. The action is on a note given in satisfaction for a debt incurred
nine years before. The note is in the son's handwriting except for the
father's signature. The father is dead, the plaintiff son is the only other
witness, and the original cannot be found. In this situation there is at least
occasion for fraud. A court's evaluation of the reliability of carbon copies
in general, shaped under the exigencies of individual cases will, in large
part, determine its view on the admissibility of carbon copies as primary
evidence.
John J. Cleary.
7. MORGAN, MAGUIRE & WEINSTEIN, EVIDENCE 150 (4th ed. 1957). Cf. Giersch
v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R. Co., 98 Kan. 452, 158 Pac. 54 (1916) ; Hay v.
American Fire Clay Co., 179 Mo. App. 567, 162 S.W. 666 (1913). This would be
true of a photostat made after the original resulting in a facsimile.
8. See 4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1179 (3d ed. 1940).
9. See 4 id. § 1192.
10. This is equally true under the theory of "duplicate originals" or "inter-
changeable copies."
11. In the use of carbon copying there is a convenient opportunity for deception
by the use of but little ingenuity made possible by the fact that the carbon im-
pression is completely hidden while being executed. Thus, where an original with
several purported carbon copies attached is signed, each underlying copy acquires a
carbon imprint of the signature, but may not in the rush or routine be individually
inspected.
12. Renner v. Bank of Columbia, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 166 (1824) ; United States
v. Manton, 107 F.2d 834 (2d Cir. 1938) ; see 4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1179 (3d ed.
1940).
13. The main reason that a foundation is required for the admission of secondary
evidence is to show that the proponent is not at fault in failing to produce the original.
If admitted, it will be designated secondary evidence which will presumably affect
the probative weight accorded it. In addition, to require the proponent to account for
not producing the original may provide some basis for a preliminary determination
of the document's genuineness before admitting it in evidence.
JANUARY 1958]
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EVIDENCE-CORROBORATION-NECESSITY OF CORROBORATION
OF PROSECUTRIX'S TESTIMONY IN PROSECUTION FOR RAPE.
Wedmore v. State (Ind. 1957).
In a prosecution for statutory rape, it was shown that the prosecutrix
made a statement to the police, the day after the alleged act, that defendant
had intercourse with her and that a few hours later the same day she related
the incident to her sister-in-law and to two other girls who had accompanied
her to the apartment where it was to have occurred. There was no evi-
dence that a physical or mental examination had been made of the prosecu-
trix. Six months later, she called defendant's sister and said that she
desired to change her "story." Subsequently prosecutrix went voluntarily
to defense counsel's office and signed an affidavit stating that defendant had
never had intercourse with her. Two years later defendant was convicted
by a jury of assault and battery 1 upon the minor prosecutrix on her testi-
mony relating to the alleged intercourse. He appealed from a judgment
entered thereon to the Supreme Court of Indiana which affirmed, 2 holding,
that the evidence on the record sustained a conviction, since the issue of
whether the prosecutrix was telling the truth when she testified that de-
fendant had intercourse with her or when she denied it in a statement made
in the defense attorney's office was for the jury, and that a conviction of rape
may be sustained upon the uncorroborated testimony of a prosecutrix with-
out any psychiatric examination being made to support her credibility.
Wedmore v. State, 143 N.E.2d 649 (Ind. 1957).3
The rule at common law, adhered to in most jurisdictions in the absence
of statute, is that a conviction of rape may be sustained upon the uncor-
roborated testimony of the prosecutrix, 4 even where the defendant, under
1. "Any touching of the person [of a female child under the age of sixteen years]
with the intent to have sexual intercourse with her, is in legal contemplation without
her consent." Caudill v. State, 224 Ind. 531, 536, 69 N.E.2d 549, 551 (1946), setting
forth the rule that a party may be found guilty of the lesser included offense of assault
and battery in a prosecution for rape.
2. Emmert, J., dissented, and judicially noticed the record of the first trial
wherein a conviction was reversed for want of jurisdiction of the subject matter
by the court. Wedmore v. State, 223 Ind. 545, 122 N.E.2d 1 (1954). The majority
expressly refused to consider the first trial. The facts outlined there are: when
the prosecutrix was taken to police headquarters, she was threatened with "Reform
School" and then made a statement that both defendant and his brother had relations
with her. The State never called as witnesses the people to whom she allegedly
"complained." Her first day on the witness stand, at the first trial, she denied seven
times having had sexual intercourse with the defendant; she accused him the next
day. Between the time she telephoned defendant's sister and went to defense counsel's
office (about 5 months) she executed an affidavit before a deputy prosecuting attorney
that she had perjured herself at the first trial when she accused defendant's brother.
3. Wedmore v. State, 143 N.E.2d 649 (Ind. 1957).
4. See,. e.g., People v. Gidney, 10 Cal. 2d 138, 73 P.2d 1186 (1937); People v.
Langer, 384 Ill. 608, 52 N.E.2d 194 (1944) ; Commonwealth v. Bemis, 242 Mass.
582, 136 N.E. 597 (1922) ; State v. Walton, 43 N.M. 71, 92 P.2d 157 (1939) ; Com-
monwealth v. Ebert, 146 Pa. Super. 362, 22 A.2d 610 (1941) ; State v. Beacraft,
126 W. Va. 859, 30 S.E.2d 541 (1944). The rule is the same in prosecutions for
statutory rape, forcible rape, and attempts.
[VOL. 3.
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oath, explicitly denies the act. 5 A number of jurisdictions have statutory
provisions requiring more than the bare testimony of the victim to carry
a case to the jury,6 several of them requiring corroboration of the identity
of the accused and of the corpus delicti,7 while others require corroboration
of the identity of the accused.8 Decisions abound qualifying the common law
rule. They belie the apparent rigorousness of the black-letter, which recites
that the uncorroborated testimony is sufficient to sustain a conviction, and
demonstrate that in practice a reviewing court will consider the peculiar
circumstances of each case and will require that the prosecutrix's testimony
in a sense be corroborated by bringing together a number of surrounding
facts and circumstances tending to prove the truth of the testimonyY It
has been stated that the testimony must be of a clear and convincing na-
ture,10 and not contain numerous and material contradictions and incon-
sistencies 11 nor be inherently improbable or incredible.' 2 Corroboration
has been required, for example, where the testimony has been elicited
through fear, threats and coercion. 13 On the other hand, some courts have
been peculiarily lenient where an infant prosecutrix has made contradictory
statements, or has been otherwise impeached as to truth and chastity, on
grounds that it was for the jury to determine credibility and the testimony
was not inherently improbable.14
5. People v. Hiddleson, 389 Ill. 293, 59 N.E.2d 639 (1945), Commonwealth v.
Wire, 5 York Legal Record 11 (Pa. 1891). A minor who acquiesces in the act is
considered a victim, precluding the rule which requires that an accomplice's testimony
be corroborated to sustain a conviction. Commonwealth v. Feist, 50 Pa. Super. 152
(1912).
6. See State v. Beltz, 225 Iowa 155, 279 N.W. 386 (1938) ; People v. Girolyme,
78 N.Y.S.2d 845 (1948), for policy of such legislation.
7. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 2013, People v. Romano, 279 N.Y. 392, 18 N.E.2d 634
(1939).
8. IOWA CODE ANN. § 782.4, State v. Banks, 227 Iowa 1208, 290 N.W. 534 (1940).
The common law of Nebraska is that corroboration is necessary to prove the corpus
delicti but not the identity of the accused. Noonan v. State, 117 Neb. 520, 221
N.W. 434 (1928).
9. Kidwell v. United States, 38 App. D.C. 566 (1912) ; State v. Gibbs, 45 Idaho
760, 265 Pac. 24 (1928); Upton v. State, 192 Miss. 339, 6 So. 2d 129 (1942);
State v. Goodale, 210 Mo. 275, 109 S.W. 9 (1908); Wiedeman v. State, 141 Neb.
579, 4 N.W.2d 566 (1942) ; State v. Ellison, 19 N.M. 428, 144 Pac. 10 (1914) ; Ganzel
v. State, 185 Wis. 589, 201 N.W. 724 (1925); Rex v. Berry, 18 Cr. App. Rep. 65
(Eng. 1924).
10. People v. Vaughn, 390 11. 360, 61 N.E.2d 546 (1945); Morris v. State, 9
Okla. Crim. Rep. 241, 131 Pac. 731 (1913); Brown v. State, 127 Wis. 193, 106
N.W. 536 (1906).
11. State v. Connelly, 57 Minn. 482, 59 N.W. 479 (1894); State v. Tevis, 234
Mo. 276, 136 S.W. 339 (1911) ; Woodruff v. State, 74 Okla. Crim. Rep. 289, 125
P.2d 211 (1942); Blumenthal v. State, 98 Tex. Crim. Rep. 601, 267 S.W. 727
(1925).
12. State v. Moe, 68 Mont. 552, 219 Pac. 830 (1923); Mares v. Territory, 10
N.M. 770, 65 Pac. 165 (1901) ; DeWitt v. State, 79 Okla. Crim. Rep. 136, 152 P.2d 284
(1944) ; Self v. State, 62 Okla. Crim. Rep. 208, 70 P.2d 1083 (1937).
13. Woodruff v. State, 74 Okla. Crim. Rep. 289, 125 P.2d 211 (1942); Palmer v.
State, 7 Okla. Crim. Rep. 557, 124 Pac. 928 (1912).
14. See People v. Rabbit, 64 Cal. App. 264, 221 Pac. 391 (1923); People v
Wademan, 38 Cal. App. 116, 175 Pac. 791 (1918) ; People v. Slaughter, 33 Cal. App.
365, 165 Pac. 44 (1917) ; State v. Thomas, 318 Mo. 843, 1 S.W.2d 157 (1927).
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"The grave danger to the innocent in permitting a sex conviction to
stand on the uncorroborated testimony of a prosecutrix is conceded by all
the experienced medical authorities in the field." 15 They are unanimous
in holding that "the complainant in a sex offense should always be examined
by competent experts to ascertain whether she suffers from some mental
or moral delusions or tendency, 16 frequently found especially in young
girls, causing distortion of the imagination in sex cases." 17 The instaht
case overruled Burton v. State,' s decided in 1953, "insofar as . . . [it]
purports to require that in any sex case the complaining witness be required
to be examined, before testifying, by a psychiatrist . ..." 19 However,
the Burton case did "not hold that in every case where a sexual offense is
charged there should be a psychiatric examination of the prosecutrix. [For,
as was noted therein:] There are many cases where the facts and circum-
stances leave no doubt of the guilt of the accused . . .", 20 What that
case did require was that a prosecutrix's testimony be either corroborated
by other facts and circumstances or else that she be examined to assure
against the danger of fantasy which psychiatrists regard as a common oc-
currence. The several cases decided in Indiana subsequent to the Burton
case demonstrate the application of the rule; 21 the instant case, a prosecu-
tion based entirely upon the uncorroborated testimony of an admitted per-
jurer, called for it.
John Thaddeus Grablewski.
FEDERAL JURISDICTION-COUNTERCLAIM-WAIVER OF
STATUTE BARRING COUNTERCLAIM IN CONTRACT ACTION
INSTITUTED BY THE UNITED STATES.
United States v. Shainfine (E.D. Pa. 1957).
The defendant placed a deposit and submitted a bid with the United
States for certain chemicals which the United States had placed on sale.
15. Wedmore v. State, 143 N.E.2d 649, 657 (Ind. 1957) (dissenting opinion).
"No judge should ever let a sex-offense charge go to the jury unless the female
complainant's social history and mental makeup have been examined and testified
to by a qualified physician." 3 WIMORE, EVIDENCE § 924a (3d ed. 1940).
16. "Psuedologia phantasticia is a mixture of lies with imagination. Not infre-
quently, this is the basis of alleged sexual assault. Girls assert they have been
raped, sometimes recounting as true a story they have heard, falsely naming indi-
viduals or describing them." 1 GRAY's ATTORNEys' TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE § 96.16
(3d ed. 1950).
17. The American Bar Association, Committee on the Improvement of the Law
of Evidence (1937-38), as cited in 3 WIC.MORE, EVIDENCE § 924a (3d ed. 1940).
18. 232 Ind. 246, 111 N.E.2d 892 (1953).
19. Wedmore v. State, 143 N.E.2d 649, 654 (Ind. 1957).
20. Burton v. State, 232 Ind. 246, 255, 111 N.E.2d 892, 896 (1953).
21. Stearns v. State, 134 N.E.2d 148 (Ind. 1956) ; Douglas v. State, 234 Ind.
621 (1955) ; 130 N.E.2d 465; Pond v. State, 233 Ind. 585, 121 N.E.2d 640 (1954);
Shannon v. State, 233 Ind. 666, 122 N.E.2d 81 (1954).
[VOL. 3.
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The bid was accepted and the goods tendered to the defendant, who re-
fused to accept delivery on the ground that a portion thereof did not con-
form to.the sample shown him prior to the submission of his bid. He then
made a demand for the deposit which the United States refused. More
than six years after this refusal, the United States instituted an action for
breach of contract to recover the difference between the contract price and
the selling price less the deposit. The defendant filed a counterclaim to
recover his deposit. The United States moved to strike this counterclaim
on the ground that it was barred by the six year statute of limitations. The
federal district court denied the motion and held that where the United
States delayed filing suit until the statute of limitations had run, it waived
that statute as a defense against defendant's counterclaim. United States
v. Shainfine, 151 F. Supp. 586 (E.D. Pa. 1957).1
The United States is not bound by a -statute of limitations when it
brings an action in the federal or state courts.2  Generally, in filing suit a
plaintiff subjects himself to the jurisdiction of the court and to any cause
of action which the defendant may use by way of counterclaim against
him.3  However, this rule has generally not been applied in a case wherein
the United States is the party plaintiff. 4 It has been held in United States
v. The Thekla 5 that the United States takes the position of a private liti-
gant when it comes into court to assert a claim in admiralty but this doc-
trine has not been generally applied to civil actions instituted by the United
States.6 However, a party whose direct remedy for a tax refund is barred
by the statute of limitations may assert this cause of action in a counter-
claim to an action brought by the United States.7 The federal district
courts have been granted original jurisdiction concurrent with the United
States Court of Claims in certain actions.8 This jurisdiction, according to
the weight of authority, does not give the courts power to allow recovery
on counterclaims.9 However, to avoid a multiplicity of suits, the federal
1. United States v. Shainfine, 151 F. Supp. 586 (E.D. Pa. 1957).
2. United States v. Summerlin, 310 U.S. 414 (1940) ; United States v. Thompson,
98 U.S. 486 (1879).
3. RPSTATEMIN , CONFLICT OF LAWS § 83 (1934); RESTATEMENT, JUDGM-NTS § 21
(1942).
4. United States v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495 (1940) ; United States v. United States
Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 309 U.S. 506 (1940) ; United States v. Joseph Behr and Sons
Inc., 110 F. Supp. 286 (N.D. Ill. 1953) ; United States v. Lashlee, 105 F. Supp. 184
(W.D. Ark. 1952).
5. 266 U.S. 328 (1924).
6. United States v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495 (1940) ; United States v. Lashlee, 105 F.
Supp. 184 (W.D. Ark. 1952).
7. Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247 (1935).
8. The district courts have original jurisdiction in civil actions, not sounding in tort,
against the United States where the claim does not exceed ten thousand dollars. 28
U.S.C. § 1346 (a) (2) (1952). The district courts have exclusive jurisdiction in tort
claims against the United States wherein the United States, if a private person, would
be liable to the claimant. 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (b) (1952).
9. United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584 (1941) (since the court in which the
United States brings an action is not sitting as a court of claims) ; United States v.
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courts have permitted counterclaims arising from the same circumstances
as the government's claim where such claim could be asserted against the
United States as a direct claim under the Federal Torts Claims Act
(FTCA) .10 Although it is clear that an affirmative judgment on a counter-
claim will not be rendered in favor of the defendant when the United
States brings the action," there is authority holding that the United States
takes the status of a private litigant in suits under the FTCA.1 2 In United
States v. Capital Transit Co."3 the United States, by filing an action more
than two years after the cause of action arose, was precluded from object-
ing to a counterclaim arising from the same transaction on which it based
its suit.1 4  The court was of the opinion that it would be contrary to the
policy of the FTCA to permit the United States to avoid a counterclaim
by allowing two years to pass before it instituted an action.' 5 There is no
prior authority holding that the aforementioned principles apply to contract
actions by the United States. In a contract action involving private liti-
gants, a counterclaim arising from the same transaction as plaintiff's claim
may reduce plaintiff's recovery notwithstanding the bar of the statute of
limitations.' 6 Contract actions against the United States must be filed
within six years after the cause of action accrues.' 7
The present case is one of first impression and extends the rule of the
Capital Transit Co. case to contract actions wherein the United States is
the party plaintiff. Although the result of the instant case is desirable it
broadens the scope of the use of counterclaims against the United States.',
Yet, it appears to be in harmony with the spirit and purpose of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.' 9 However, the scope of the present holding
should be limited to defensive actions and an affirmative recovery should
not be allowed since this would permit a counterclaim barred by the statute
Nipissing Mines Co., 206 Fed. 431 (2d Cir. 1913) (since the statute refers expressly
to original suits) ; United States v. Double Bend Mfg. Co., 114 F. Supp. 750 (S.D.
N.Y. 1953). Contra, United States v. Silverton, 200 F.2d 824 (1st Cir. 1952) ; United
States v. King, 119 F. Supp. 398 (D. Alaska 1954).
10. 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (b); See Graske v. Johnson, 97 F. Supp. 678 (S.D. N.Y.
1951) ; United States v. Harms, 96 F. Supp. 1022 (D. Colo. 1951) ; United States v.
Schlitz, 9 F.R.D. 259 (E.D. Va. 1949).
11. United States v. Wilkes Barre Transit Corp., 143 F. Supp. 413 (M.D. Pa.
1956) ; United States v. Webb Trucking Co., 141 F. Supp. 573 (D. Del. 1956) ; United
States v. W. H. Pollard Co., 124 F. Supp. 495 (N.D. Cal. 1954) ; United States v. Boris,
122 F. Supp. 936 (E.D. Pa. 1954).
12. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543 (1951) ; United States v. Aetna
Casualty & Surety, 338 U.S. 366 (1949).
13. 108 F. Supp. 348 (D. D.C. 1952).
14. FED. R. CIV. P. 13(a) which defines compulsory counterclaims as those arising
out of the same transaction upon which the opposing party bases his action.
15. See note 13 supra.
16. Sullivan v. Hoover, 6 F.R.D. 513 (D. D.C. 1947).
17. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) (1952).
18. See FED. R. CIV. P. 13(d) which states that the rules of counterclaims should
not be construed to extend counterclaims against the United States.
19. "The rules should be construed to secure just, speedy, and inexpensive deter-
mination of every action." FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
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to have the full effect of the original cause of action. Such an application
of the rule of the instant case might discourage direct claims against the
government in the federal district courts and induce claimants to withhold
their cause of action until suit was commenced by the United States.
20
Conversely, if the defendant is to be bound by the statute of limitations, the
United States could well delay its action long enough to bar defendant's
compulsory counterclaim. 21 It would seem that in fairness, the government
should either bring its action within the period of the statute or waive it
as a defense to defendant's counterclaim. The principle of United States
v. Capital Transit Co.2 should be extended to contract actions since the
difference between the types of action should not create a conflicting policy
in regard to counterclaims against the United States by limiting waiver of
the statute of limitations to actions sounding in tort.
Leon A. Mankowski
INSURANCE-VENDOR AND PURCHASER-RIGHT TO PROCEEDS
OF FIRE INSURANCE POLICY REQUIRED
BY AGREEMENT OF SALE.
Raplee v. Piper (N.Y. 1957).
In 1949, Raplee entered an executory contract to purchase a farm from
Piper and in the agreement assumed the burden of paying the premiums on
a fire insurance policy covering the premises. The policy named only Piper
as the insured. Five years later, while the buyer was in possession, fire
destroyed a barn on the property, and the insurance company paid $4,650
to Piper to compensate for the loss. At this time $5,200 of the purchase
money remained outstanding, and Raplee tendered $550 to Piper in full
satisfaction of the purchase money debt claiming credit thereon for the
indemnity paid to Piper. Piper refused the tender on the grounds that she
was entitled to the proceeds of the insurance by virtue of her insurable in-
terest in the realty and that the buyer had no interest in the proceeds since
she was the only insured named in the policy. Raplee filed a bill for specific
performance, tendering the $550 into court. The Supreme Court of New
York granted specific performance. This decision was unanimously affirmed
by the appellate division.1 Both the trial and the appellate courts relied on
the Uniform Vendor and Purchaser Risk Act 2 which places the risk of loss
20. The instant decision does not discuss why the present defendant did not file
,suit to recover his deposit before the lapse of the statutory period. It may well have
been because of the relatively small amount involved since the amount of his deposit
was $408.00.
21. See United States v. Capital Transit Co., 108 F. Supp. 348 (D. D.C. 1952).
22. 108 F. Supp. 348 (D. D.C. 1952).
1. Raplee v. Piper, 2 App. Div. 2d 732, 152 N.Y.S.2d 799 (3d Dep't 1957).
2. N.Y. REAL PROPERTY LAW § 240-a.
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on a purchaser in possession, and consequently concluded that he who must
bear the loss is in equity entitled to the benefits of the insurance. The
Court of Appeals of New York, with three justices dissenting, affirmed this
decision, but specifically disavowed reliance on the statute, stating that
even at common law the purchaser was entitled to credit the insurance pro-
ceeds against the purchase money.3  Raplee v. Piper, 3 N.Y.2d 179, 164
N.Y.S.2d 732 (1957). 4
The determination of the question of who will benefit from insurance
proceeds from a policy covering property destroyed after the making of a
contract of sale but before a transfer of the deed when the policy is in the
vendor's name only and the rules of law applicable to that determination
were amply discussed in the English case of Rayner v. Preston.5 In that
case the policy of insurance was deemed an indemnity contract collateral
to the agreement of sale and not related to the property interest. Hence
the policy was payable only to those in privity with respect to the insurance
contract without reference to privity of estate. The development of New
York law on this question both before and after Rayner supports this view
with few exceptions. In Cromwell v. Brooklyn Fire Ins. Co.,6 decided be-
fore Rayner, although the court allowed the purchaser an equitable lien
on the insurance proceeds, it did so only because the agreement of sale
showed that the vendor had agreed as part of the consideration to insure
the purchaser's interest, and dicta restate very clearly the personal character
of the insurance contract.7  The later case of Turner v. Bryant,8 in a com-
plex fact situation, seems to support the trust theory of determining the
right to the insurance proceeds. Under the trust theory, the trust relation
between vendor and purchaser in respect to property transferred under an
executory contract is enlarged so that it includes the proceeds of the insur-
ance policy. Therefore, the proceeds are applied to the benefit of all persons
interested in the property. The party who paid the premiums is reimbursed
by the beneficiaries on a pro rata basis. A number of American jurisdictions
have adopted this view because under it the benefit of the insurance follows
3. "Section 240-a of the Real Property Law, Consol. Laws, c. 50, has nothing
to do with the present case. . . . Thus either at common law or under section 240-a
this vendee would be in the same position. He must take the damaged property and
pay the full purchase price, but he is entitled to credit for the insurance proceeds
since he and the vendor have so agreed." Raplee v. Piper, 3 N.Y.2d 179, 180, 164
N.Y.S.2d 732, 734 (1957). Despite the text, there was no specific agreement that
the vendee would have credit for the proceeds; there was only the express agreement
that the vendee should pay the premiums.
4. Raplee v. Piper, 3 N.Y.2d 179, 164 N.Y.S.2d 732 (1957).
5. [18811 18 Ch. 1.
6. 44 N.Y. 42, 4 Am. Rep. 641 (1871).
7. "A contract of insurance against fire, as a general rule, is a mere personal
contract between the assured and the underwriter to indemnify the former against
the loss he may sustain; and in case a mortgagor effects an insurance upon a mort-
gaged premises, the mortgagee can claim no benefit from it, unless he can base his
claim upon some agreement." Id. at 47, 4 Am. Rep. at 646.
8. 152 App. Div. 601, 137 N.Y. Supp. 466 (3d Dep't 1912).
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the risk of loss.9 Notwithstanding this interpretation of the law by other
states, New York, in Brownell v. Board of Education,10 clarified the status
of its law, and adhered to the minority position of Rayner v. Preston."
The principles of Brownell have been generally followed. 12 Defense of the
position has often been found in the insurance statutes 18 which provide the
vendor with an insurable interest despite the existence of a contract of sale
and the passing of equitable title to the property.
The instant case is unquestionably a basic departure from the rule
of law applied in Brownell v. Board of Education.'4 In that case, the risk
of loss was on the purchaser, the insurance policy was in the name of the
vendor only, and the fire occurred before the executory contract was per-
formed. The court held that only the vendor was entitled to the proceeds.
In this case, the same elements as above are present, yet the court holds
the purchaser is entitled to credit the insurance proceeds paid the vendor
against the purchase money still owed. In other words, the court adopts
in Raplee v. Piper what it rejected in Brownell v. Board of Education, the
principle that in equity one man's loss cannot be another man's gain. In
this case, New York has shifted from its minority position, which was based
on the Rayner case, to the position of the majority of the states which gives
the person holding the risk of loss an equitable right in the insurance pro-
ceeds. Such a shift is noteworthy because it allies New York with the
majority and is desirable because it accomplishes in practical result the
original intent of the parties. The seller receives his full consideration and
has no just cause for complaint. The buyer receives title to the property
for which he bargained in the contract. The depreciation in value which
the damage has caused is placed on the insurance company which calculated
that risk when establishing the premiums. Finally, the buyer, who pays
the insurance premiums, is permitted to recoup the amount of the deprecia-
tion out of the indemnity paid the seller by deducting that amount from his
contract purchase money obligation.
John M. Regan.
9. See,. e.g., Kaufman v. All Persons, 16 Cal. App. 388, 117 Pac. 586 (1911)
Brady v. Welsh, 200 Iowa 44, 204 N.W. 235 (1925) ; Skinner & Sons Co. v. Houghton,
92 Md. 68, 48 Atl. 85 (1900) ; Decorative Utilities Co. v. National Motors Co., 123
N.J. Eq. 48, 196 Atl. 381 (1938) ; Gilbert v. Port, 28 Ohio St. 276 (1876) ; Insurance
Company v. Alberstadt, 383 Pa. 556, 119 A.2d 83 (1956) ; Brakhage v. Tracey, 13
S.D. 343, 83 N.W. 363 (1900).
10. 239 N.Y. 369, 146 N.E. 630 (1925).
11. [1881] 18 Ch. 1.
12. Rosenbloom v. Maryland Insurance Co., 258 App. Div. 14, 15 N.Y.S.2d 304
(4th Dep't 1939); Polley v. Daniels, 238 App. Div. 181, 264 N.Y. Supp. 194 (3d
Dep't 1933) ; Rath v. Aerovias Interamericanas de Panama, 205 Misc. 135, 127
N.Y.S.2d 231 (1953) ; Cowan v. Sutherland, 117 N.Y.S.2d 365 (1952) ; City of
Utica v. Park-Mill Co., 41 N.Y.S.2d 248 (1943) ; Szatkus v. Schaub, 141. Misc.
177, 252 N.Y. Supp. 350 (1931) ; contra Persico v. Guernsey, 129 Misc. 190, 220 N.Y.
Supp. 689 (1927), aff'd, 222 App. Div. 719, 225 N.Y. Supp. 890 (1st Dep't 1927).
13. N.Y. INSURANCE LAW § 170.
14. See 239 N.Y. 369, 374, 146 N.E. 630, 634 (1925).
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JURISDICTION-FOREIGN CORPORATIONS-
STATUTORY SERVICE OF PROCESS.
Berkman v. Ann Lewis Shops (2d Cir. 1957).
Plaintiff brought suit in a New York federal district court as assignee
of three Florida state court judgments obtained by the assignor, the Cuesta
Rey & Co., against the defendant. The defendant is a parent corporation
retailing women's apparel through various subsidiaries organized for this
purpose. The Ann Lewis Shops of Tampa, one such subsidiary, entered
into a lease with Cuesta Rey & Co. which was negotiated and guaranteed
by the parent corporation. There was a default and Cuesta Rey & Co.
sued both the subsidiary and the parent corporation. Substituted service
of process was made in accordance with Florida law 1 and a default judg-
ment was entered when neither appeared to defend the action. The court
of appeals, with one judge dissenting, affirmed the district court's decision,
holding that the Florida court was without jurisdiction to render the judg-
ment here sued upon against the defendant, because the fact of having a
subsidiary in Florida did not constitute "doing business" in Florida on the
defendant's part. Berkman v. Ann Lewis Shops, 246 F.2d 44 (2d Cir.
1957) .2
The landmark case of Pennoyer v. Neff ' laid down the inflexible rule
that personal service within the jurisdiction is absolutely necessary for an
in personam judgment against a nonresident. This rule proved unwork-
able in an era of expanding interstate commercial activity with respect to
foreign corporations doing business within a state and resulted in the de-
cision of the International Shoe Co. v. Washington 4 case. There the court
qualified the rule of the Pennoyer case by allowing substituted service to
subject a foreign corporation to personal jurisdiction when the corporation
had sufficient contact or ties with the forum to make it reasonable and just
according to our traditional concepts of fair play and substantial justice to
do so. 5 In the case of French v. Gibbs Corp.,6 Judge Learned Hand laid
down the principle that the minimum contact necessary for due process is
1. FLA. S'TAT. ANN. §§ 47.16, 47.30 (1954). The pertinent parts of the statute are
as follows: § 47.16 "The acceptance by . . all foreign corporations ... of the privil-
ege extended by law to nonresidents and others to operate, conduct, engage in, or
carry on a business or business venture, in the state . . .shall be deemed equivalent to
an appointment by such persons and foreign corporations of the secretary of state of
the state as the agent of such persons or foreign corporations upon whom may be served
all lawful process in any action, suit, or proceeding against them, or either of them,
arising out of any transaction or operation connected with or incidental to such business
or business venture .. " (emphasis added). § 47.30 sets out the method of service upon
nonresidents, and contains the usual provisions for registered mail, method of serving
the secretary of state, usual fees, etc.
2. Berkman v. Ann Lewis Shops, 246 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1957). The court based its
decision on the rule enunciated in Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U.S.'
333 (1925). See note 12 infra.
3. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
4. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
5. Id. at 320.
6. 189 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1951).
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satisfied by any continuous activity, regardless of its quality or extent, and
advanced the idea of balancing the inconvenience to the corporation to stand
suit in the foreign jurisdiction against the kind of contact. Later state
court cases have held, under statutes similar to the one in the instant case,
that jurisdiction can be based on a single act 7 as is done in the nonresident
motorist statutes.8 In Schutt v. Commercial Traveler's Mut. Accident
Ass'n9 under a Tennessee statute making any act by an insurer "doing
business," the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the mail-
ing of premium notices into the state was sufficient to subject the insurer
to the state's jurisdiction. In keeping with the current trend of authority
it is apparent that the Florida statute, in using the words "business venture,"
requires less than "doing business" to subject a corporation to its jurisdic-
tion.10  In the case of Parmalee v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n,"
the federal court held a non-resident insurer subject to the court's jurisdic-
tion although all its business was transacted in Florida by mail, finding
this to be sufficient contact for validly asserting jurisdiction.
It is submitted that the majority was unwise in basing their decision
on the rule of the Cannon case which states that service on a wholly owned
subsidiary is not service on the parent.12 There is conflicting authority on
this point which tends to question its present application.' 3 In applying
this rule to the instant case the court overlooked the fact that service was
made upon the defendant in strict compliance with the applicable Florida
7. See Compania De Astral, S.A. v. Boston Metal Corp., 205 Md. 237, 107 A.2d
357 (1954) ; Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Corp., 116 Vt. 596, 80 A.2d 664 (1951).
8. See Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
9. 229 F.2d 158, 159 (2d Cir. 1956) "Where the defendant received notice [as in
the instant case] and is afforded an opportunity to defend, substituted service is good
for in personam judgments if minimum contacts are present."
•10. Cf. State ex rel. Weber v. Register, 67 So.2d 619, 620 (Fla. 1953), where the
court said: "There is a vast difference between the words 'business' and the words
'business venture' as used in section 47.16 supra. One may engage in a 'business venture'
without operating, conducting, engaging in or carrying on a business."
11. 206 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1953).
12. Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U.S. 333 (1925). Where the
delfe4idant conducted its operation in North Carolina by means of a wholly owned
subsidiary corporation, the subsidiary did not act as the defendant's agent but existed
as a separate corporate entity in all respects. All the transactions between the two
.corporations were represented by appropriate entries in their respective books in the
same way as if the two were wholly independent corporations. Plaintiff sued for breach
of contract to purchase cotton sheeting for defendant's use in packing meat. The only
service of process in the action was made upon an agent of the subsidiary corporation.
The defendant was not otherwise served. The court held that the defendant was not
"doing business" within the state so as to warrant an assumption of jurisdiction on the
basis of service upon the subsidiary.
13. See Harris v. Dreere & Co., 223 F.2d 161 (4th Cir. 1955) and the cases cited
therein approving the Cannon doctrine. But see Wanamaker v. Lewis,, 153 F. Supp.
195 (D. Md. 1957) where the Mutual Broadcasting Co. was held to have been validly
served by service on the State Tax Commissioner since the Mutual Broadcasting Co.
had purchased the right to use, and had used, locally owned facilities of affiliated
stations in Maryland. This constituted "doing business" in Maryland according to this
court. See also State ex rel. Grinnell Co. v. MacPherson, 309 P.2d 981 (N.M. 1957)
where three corporations, although technically separate in a parent-subsidiary organiza-
tion, were held to be one enterprise since they held themselves out as one by their use
of the same basic name and overlapping advertising. It is submitted that if counsel
for the plaintiff had put in evidence the advertising of Ann Lewis garments by the
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statute 14 based upon the defendant's own contacts with the state of Florida.
The issue in this case should have been whether the Florida court was
correct in asserting its jurisdiction on the basis of the defendant's guarantee
of the subsidiary's lease and other activities in Florida, not whether the
presence of a subsidiary in Florida constituted "doing business" there.
For all practical purposes we could completely disregard the subsidiary's
existence and still find the guaranteeing of the lease and the organization of
the subsidiary by the parent to be a "business venture" within the Florida
statute. The defendant actively established its subsidiary in Florida. It is
difficult to conceive of a court holding this not to be a "business venture" if
any claims resulted from the defendant's activities in setting up the sub-
sidiary. The defendant continued its contact with Florida subsequent to
the establishment of the subsidiary by guaranteeing the subsidiary's lease
for a period of twenty-five years. This is sufficient to supply the continu-
out activity required in Learned Hand's formulation of the rule 15 and a
balancing of the interests would show that it would not be inequitable to
subject the corporation to a suit in Florida where the subject of the action
arose. 16 As a result of this decision the court has substantially impaired
the value of the defendant's guarantee to the plaintiff's assignor by increas-
ing the cost of collecting it. 17 The state has a right to protect its citizens
from such a result, and this is the very evil the statute in question, and
other typical statutes,' 8 were designed to correct.
Edward I. Carney, Jr.
LABOR LAW-RAILWAY. LABOR ACT-UNION SHOP PROVISION.
Looper v. Georgia So. & Fla. Ry. (Ga. 1957).
The petitioners, railroad employees, were notified that if they did not
become members of a labor union within sixty days, their employment
would be terminated. This notification was given pursuant to an employ-
defendant and the subsidiary, as was so effectively done in the Grinnell case, the instant
case probably would have been decided in the plaintiff's favor. The Grinnell case shows
an inclination on the part of the court to disregard the technical separateness of the
corporations and look to their practical effect.
14. It is interesting and very important to note that in both the Cannon and the
Harris cases noted supra, the service was made only on the subsidiary and not the
parent corporation as was done in the instant case.
15. See French v. Gibbs Corp., 189 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1951) ; see text at note 6.
16. However, an argument could be made that since the defendant was willing to
be present in Florida to set up the subsidiary corporation it would not be inconvenient
to require it to defend an action from the establishment of the subsidiary.
17. It is submitted that it will cost substantially more to prove the plaintiff's claim
in New York than it will to prove the claim in Florida where the cause of action arose
and subsequently sue on the Florida judgment in New York.
18. See, e.,q. MD. CODi: ANN. Awr. 23 § 88 (d), (Flack 1951) ; N. C. GEN. STAT.
§ 55-145 (1955).
[VOL. 3.
16
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 2 [1958], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol3/iss2/6
RECENT DECISIONS
ment contract, drawn pursuant to provisions of the Railway Labor Act,1
between the defendants, comprising a number of railroads and various labor
organizations. The action was for injunctive relief to prevent the enforce-
ment of the union shop agreement. It was alleged, inter alia, that part of
the fees, dues, and assessments which the petitioners would be required to
pay as members of the union would be used to support ideological and
political doctrines and candidates which the petitioners were not willing to
support, and that to enforce the contract would violate the petitioners' right.
of freedom of association, thought, liberty, and property. It was further al-
leged that the contract, and the Railway Labor Act to the extent that it au-
thorizes such agreements, are violative of the first, fifth, and ninth amend-
ments of the Federal Constitution. The case was brought to the Supreme
Court of Georgia to review a Georgia superior court judgment dissolving
the injunction and dismissing the case on the grounds that no cause of action
was stated. The supreme court held that one cannot constitutionally be
compelled to contribute money to support ideas, politics, and candidates
which he opposes, and that the trial court erred in dismissing the amended
petition which alleged that such uses would be made of the money which,
as members of the union, the petitioners would be required to contribute.
Looper v. Georgia, So. & Fla. Ry., 99 S.E.2d 101, (Ga. 1957).2
It has long been recognized that the Congress has power to regulate
interstate carriers under the commerce clause of the Constitution.3 In the
field of labor relations between carriers and their employees the congres-
sional power "extends to the provisions which are reasonably calculated to
prevent the interruption of interstate commerce by strikes and their at-
tendant disorders." 4 In 1934 the Railway Labor Act 5 was passed with
the intent to promote peaceful labor relations in that industry.6 This act
prohibited union shop agreements which at the time were used to maintain
company unions. 7  By 1950 a great majority of the railroad employees
were members of unions and the nonunion employees were receiving the
benefits of collective bargaining without sharing its costs.8 Because of this
the 1951 amendment to the Railway Labor Act was passed allowing union
1. 64 STAT. 1238 (1951), 45 U.S.C. § 152 (11) (1952). The pertinent parts are:
"Notwithstanding any other provisions of this Act, or of any other statute or law ...
of any state, any carrier or carriers ... and a labor organization or labor organizations
duly designated and authorized to represent employees . . . shall be permitted-
(a) to make agreements, requiring, as a condition of continued employment, that
within sixty days following the beginning of such employment, or the effective date of
such agreements, whichever is the later, all employees shall become members of the
labor organization representing their craft or class .... "
2. Looper v. Georgia So. & Fla. Ry., 99 S.E.2d 101 (Ga. 1957).
3. Wilson v. New, 243 U.S. 332 (1917) ; United States v. Delaware & H. Co., 213
U.S. 366 (1909).
4. Virginian Ry. v. System Federation 40, Ry. Employees Dep't, AFL, 300 U.S.
515, 553 (1937).
5. 48 STAT. 1185 (1934), 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-64 (1952).
6. 48 STAT. 1186 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 151a (1952).
7. 48 STAT. 1187 (1934), 45 U.S.C. §§ 152 (4) (5) (1952).
8. H. R. REP. No. 2811, 81st. Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1950).
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shop agreements, state statutes to the contrary notwithstanding. 9 The
constitutionality of this amendment was upheld in the case of Railway Em-
ployee's Dep't v. Hanson."0 The Supreme Court of the United States in
that case limited its decision narrowly in that it held only "that the require-
ment for financial support of the collective bargaining agency by all who
receive the benefits of its work is within the power of Congress under the
commerce clause and does not violate either the First or the Fifth Amend-
ments." 11 The court in the Hanson case also expressly reserved judgment
on contracts which might be made with conditions which would force
ideological or political conformity or other action in contravention of the
first amendment. 12  It is this reservation about which the decision in the
instant case revolves.'1
Because it was a review of judgment on the pleadings, the instant de-
cision leaves open or undetermined many questions as to what extent and
in what ways the reservation by the Supreme Court in the Hanson case
might be interpreted. The tenor of the Georgia Supreme Court's opinion
indicates that the reservation might be effectively used as a means of evad-,
ing the union shop provision of the Railway Labor Act. This might be
done by the courts by requiring that if a union wishes to effect a union
shop agreement it must refrain from financially supporting any political or
ideological organizations whatsoever. In view of the inherent interest
unions have in such activities this could be quite effective in defeating the
union shop provision. Thus the intention of Congress to allow unions to
force the "free riders" to pay their share of the costs of collective bargain-
ing would also be defeated. However, in the only other case to be decided
involving this reservation of the Hanson rule,14 it was held, in a fact situa-
tion similar to that in the instant case, that the union shop agreement was
to be enforced notwithstanding union financial support of political activities.
The Texas Supreme Court said: "Surely the United States Supreme Court
in consideration of the Hanson case, if not otherwise, judicially knew of
union political activity and that funds to carry on that activity are essen-
tial." This latter interpretation acknowledges the intended purpose of the
union shop provision and does not attempt, in effect, to rehabilitate that
state's "right to work" laws which were expressly pre-empted by the fed-
eral legislation.15 Therefore it seems that this reservation by the United
States Supreme Court has various possible implications which, of course,
will only be delineated by future decisions, but it is important to keep in
9. See note 1 supra.
10. 351 U.S. 235 (1956).
11. Id. at 238.
12. "If other conditions are in fact imposed, or if the exaction of dues, initiation
fees, or assessments is used as a cover for forcing ideological conformity or other action
in contravention of the First Amendment, this judgment will not prejudice the decision
in that case." Id. at 238.
13. Looper v. Georgia So. & Fla. Ry., 99 S.E.2d 101, 105 (Ga. 1957).
14. Sandsberry v. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 295 S.W.2d 412, 416 (Tex. 1956).
15.See note I supra.
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mind the effect which the strong feelings of some of the "right to work"
law states will have in these decisions. 16
William E. Mowatt
PROPERTY-EASEMENT BY PRESCRIPTION-SPORADIC USE
OF LAKE No BASIS FOR LEGAL PRESCRIPTIVE TITLE.
Shaffer v. Baylor's Lake Association, Inc. (C.P. Pa. 1957).
Plaintiff, legal owner of an interest in a piece of land bordering on de-
fendant's lake, instituted suit in the form of an action to quiet title to
establish her claim of a prescriptive right to use 'the waters of the lake.
Plaintiff's land had been primarily used for farming purposes and was im-
proved with a dwelling house in which the plaintiff and her husband resided.
There had been continuous occupancy of the land by some member or
members of plaintiff's family for twenty-one or more years to the date of
commencement of suit. During the years of occupancy, the residents of
the plaintiff's premises swam in the lake during the summer season when
they desired, and fished there upon occasion. They used small row boats
on the lake which were sometimes rented to visitors, ice skated and ice
sleighed on it, and cut lake ice during the winter. It also appears that a
stone wall or dock extending out into the water and a bath house was
maintained by plaintiff for several years. At times, the farm cattle were
watered in the lake. Upon these facts the jury returned a verdict for the
plaintiff. In granting the defendant's motion for judgment notwithstand-
ing the verdict, the common pleas court held that no prescriptive right was
acquired since the plaintiff's use of the lake was occasional and sporadic
and merely for personal pleasure and convenience. Shaffer v. Baylor's
Lake Association, Inc., 137 LEGAL INTELLIGENCER No. 26, p. 1, col. 3
(Pa. C.P. Lack. June 17, 1957).'
The law is well settled in Pennsylvania that a prescriptive right to an
easement may be acquired by the continuous, uninterrupted and adverse
use of land under a claim of right for twenty-one years.2 These same ele-
ments of prescription apply to acquiring easements for the use of unnavi-
16. The present case affords a good example. The Supreme Court of Georgia
attacks the "invasion" of the right to work area by the federal government when it
states: " . . . Congress, with the sanction of the Supreme Court has projected thejurisdiction of the general government into every precinct of the states and assumes
Federal jurisdiction over countless matters, including the right to work, which are
remotely if at all related to interstate commerce." Then, after reluctantly acknowledging
its duty to follow the United States Supreme Court rulings, the judge states: "We go
now to the single point raised which the Supreme Court has, we believe clearly indicated
is still open for decision." Looper v. Georgia So. & Fla. Ry., 99 S.E.2d 101, 104 (Ga.
1957).
1. Shaffer v. Baylor's Lake Association, Inc., 137 LEGAL INflELLIcENCnR No. 26,
p. 1, col. 3 (Pa. C. P. Lack. June 17, 1957).
2. Mather-Klock, Inc. v. Plymire, 349 Pa. 194, 36 A.2d 802 (1944); Garrett v.
Jackson, 20 Pa. 331 (1853) ; Klavon v. Tindall, 180 Pa. Super. 408, 119 A.2d 554 (1956).
JANUARY 1958]
19
Editors: Recent Decisions
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1958
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
gable ponds or lakes. 3 The authorities are at variance on the subject of
the continuity of user required for the acquisition of a prescriptive right,
but it seems that the necessary continuity is present if there are such re-
peated acts of use, of such character and at such intervals, as afford
sufficient indication to the owner of the land that a right is being asserted
against him. 4 The requirement of continuity does not involve any necessity
that the user be exercised constantly and without intermission.5 The use
will be continuous if there is an exercise of the right at the pleasure of the
claimant, though at infrequent intervals.0 There can only be such continuity
of user as the right claimed will permit, and the continuity must be judged
by the nature and character of the use.7 A failure to use an easement when
not needed does not disprove a continuity of use shown by using it when
needed. 8  Yet, mere occasional acts of trespass do not satisfy the rule that
the user be continuous.9 In the case of Matthews v. Bagnik,10 the court
found that the defendant's use of a lake for watering stock, cutting ice,
fishing, swimming, boating and other uses without permission, was insuffi-
cient to establish an easement by prescription. In Loughran v. Matyle-
wicz,U1 the court denied a prescriptive right in the appellants who had used
the lake for swimming purposes and sporadic rental of boats for fishing on
the grounds that occasional and sporadic use of the lake could never ripen
into a prescriptive right.
Title by prescription has its foundation in the presumption of a grant
arising from the long continued use of the easement. 12 Courts enforce such
grants not because the court or jury believe the presumed grant to have
been actually made, but because public policy and convenience require that
long continued possession shall not be disturbed.' 3 But, prescriptive ease-
ments are not favored in the law, since they necessarily work corresponding
losses or forfeitures of the rights of other persons. The law is reluctant to
recognize a claim to an easement and the burden of proof is on the party
3. Loughran v. Matylewicz, 367 Pa. 593, 81 A.2d 879 (1951) ; Baylor v. Decker, 133
Pa. 168, 19 Atd. 351 (1890) ; Matthews v. Bagnik, 157 Pa. Super. 115, 41 A.2d 875
(1945). It is well settled in Pennsylvania that in the case of a non-navigable lake or pond
where the land under the water is owned by others, no riparian rights attach to the
property bordering on the water. Loughran v. Matylewicz, supra.
4. Hughes v. Abbott, 32 Del. Ch. 328, 86 A.2d 358 (1952) ; Jean v. Arseneault, 85
N. H. 72, 153 Atl. 819 (1931) ; Cooper v. Hollein, 102 Pgh. L. J. 475 (Pa. C.P. Ally.
1953).
5. Stuart v. Johnson, 181 Md. 145, 28 A.2d 837 (Ct. App. 1942) ; Feldman v.
Knapp, 196 Or. 453, 250 P.2d 92 (1952).
6. Bodfish v. Bodfish, 105 Mass. 317 (1870) ; Browder v. Graham, 204 Miss. 773,
38 So. 2d 188 (1948).
7. Von Meding v. Strahl, 319 Mich. 598, 30 N.W.2d 363 (1948) ; Romans v. Nadler,
217 Minn. 174, 14 N.W.2d 482 (1944). See also Messinger's Appeal, 109 Pa. 285, 4 Atl.
162 (1885).
8. Feldman v. Knapp, 196 Or. 453, 250 P.2d 92 (1952) ; Bird v. Smith, 8 Watts 434
(Pa. 1839).
9. Esling v. Williams, 10 Pa. 126 (1848) ; Texler v. Lutz, 180 Pa. Super. 24, 118
A.2d 210 (1956).
10. 157 Pa. Super. 115, 41 A.2d 875 (1945).
11. 367 Pa. 593, 81 A.2d 879 (1951).
12. Gibbs v. Sweet, 20 Pa. Super. 275 (1902).
13. See 1 THOMsPSON, REAL.PROPERTY § 373 (1924, Supp. 1929).
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asserting a claim to prove it clearly. 14 Therefore, the one claiming the ease-
ment must prove such user from which a grant may be presumed. The
court in the principle case rightly found that the user of the plaintiff did not
suffice to establish an easement by prescription. Of course, evidence suffi-
cient to create the presumption of a grant must vary according to the nature
of the right asserted and the manner of its use, but the use must be such as to
indicate that it is claimed as a right and is not the effect of indulgence or
anything short of a grant. Casual or sporadic use does not give such notice.
One cannot be permitted to acquire an easement who occasionally visits the
land or lake of another. "The owner thereof does not have to become
amphibious and dwell part of the time in the lake in order to retain his title
thereto." 15 However, this is not to say that one could never acquire an
easement through occasional and sporadic use. Such sporadic utilization
in a systematic year-round commercial manner will ripen into a prescriptive
right.16 Although this principle was recognized by the court in the instant
case, the opinion fails to disclose the exact basis for its decision. It is not
certain whether the court denied the easement because the facts of this case
did not warrant a finding for the plaintiff or whether a non-commercial
occasional and sporadic-use for pleasure can never result in an easement by
prescription. This point is obscure in Pennsylvania law. However, it
should be feasible to allow acquisition of an easement if the occasional use,
although non-commercial, be systematic, definitive, open and notorious.
James W. Schwartz
TORTS-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE-PLAINTIFF CANNOT RECOVER
IF His NEGLIGENCE CONTRIBUTED IN ANY DEGREE
TO THE RESULTING INJURY.
Crane v. Neal (Pa. 1957).
Plaintiffs were each driving a motorcycle along a highway on a dark
and rainy night when one motorcycle developed trouble, forcing it to stop.
Due to intervening muddy flats adjacent to the highway, plaintiffs did not
attempt to remove their halted cycles from the paved portion of the high-
way onto a nearby slag driveway. Both motorcycles were mounted with
lights visible for 500 feet. Just as they succeeded in starting the stalled
motor, they were struck from behind by the defendant's auto. In plaintiffs'
action in trespass defendant alleged contributory negligence in plaintiffs'
failure to remove their motorcycles from the highway, predicating this duty,
inter alia, on common law principles. The trial court instructed the jury
14. Becker v. Rittenhouse, 297 Pa. 317, 147 At. 51 (1929).
15. Camp Chicopee v. Eden, 303 Pa. 150, 155, 154 Ati. 305, 307 (1931).
16. Miller v. Lutheran Conference & Camp Ass'n., 331 Pa. 241, 200 Atl. 646 (1938).
With the exception of this case and in view of the Matthews case and the Ldughran
case, it appears after analysis that it would be most difficult to acquire a prescriptive
easement in the lake of another under the present Pennsylvania law.
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that "the contributory negligence of the party must be a proximate cause
of the accident involved . . ." to bar recovery. On the basis of this in-
struction the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiffs. On appeal the Su-
preme Court of Pennsylvania reversed and remanded, holding with one
judge dissenting, that the test for contributory negligence in Pennsylvania
is whether the plaintiffs' negligence "contributed in any degree, however
slight, to the injury," and furtheremore that it was error to instruct the
jury that the plaintiffs' negligence must be a proximate cause of the re-
sulting injury to bar his recovery. Crane v. Neal, 389 Pa. 329, 132 A.2d
675 (1957).1
The effect of the doctrine that contributory negligence is a complete
bar to recovery has made it perhaps the most important defense in negli-
gence cases.2  In order to bar recovery plaintiff's negligence must have
some causal connection with the resulting injury.3 Just what that connec-
tion must be is in dispute. 4 The general rule requires that plaintiff's neg-
ligence be a proximate cause of the resulting injury.5 Pennsylvania courts
alone have expressed the test of contributory negligence as "whether the
plaintiff's negligent act contributed in any degree, however slight, to the
resulting injury." 6 In at least one Pennsylvania case this test has been
interpreted as excluding the need for a proximate causal relationship and
has further stated that the law in this state recognizes a distinction between
the causal connection needed in negligence and that needed in contributory
negligence.7  Such a distinction has been expressly repudiated by other
jurisdictions.8
If there was any doubt prior to the instant case as to what constituted
the test of contributory negligence in Pennsylvania, the present case makes
it unmistakably clear that if the plaintiff's negligence contributes in any de-
gree whatsoever to the resulting injury he is barred from recovery. 9 Thus
the consideration of a proximate causal relationship between plaintiff's
1. Crane v. Neal, 389 Pa. 329, 132 A.2d 675 (1957).
2. See PROSSiR, TORTS § 51 (2d ed. 1955).
3. Smith v. Sheraden Bank, 178 Pa. Super. 621, 116 A.2d 346 (1947).
4. See note, 22 MINN. L. Rzv. 410 (1938) and cases cited therein.
5. Id. at 410, 412 & n.11 (1938).
6. Established in Creed v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 86 Pa. 139, 145 (1878), a number
of subsequent cases have reiterated the test. Grimes v. Yellow Cab Co., 344 Pa. 298, 25
A.2d 294 (1942) ; Robinson v. American Ice Co., 292 Pa. 366, 141 Atl. 244 (1928).
7. Cardarelli v. Simon, 149 Pa. Super. 364, 27 A.2d 250 (1942). But see Seaboard
Container Corp. v. Rothchild, 359 Pa. 51, 58 A.2d 800 (1948) ; Kasanovich v. George,
349 Pa. 199, 34 A.2d 523 (1943) ; Brazzi v. Pianetti, 165 Pa. Super. 258, 67 A.2d 578
(1949) ; Noyes v. Sternfeld, 164 Pa. Super. 461, 65 A.2d 433 (1949), where the courts
use the term proximate cause in defining contributory negligence.
8. Smernoff v. McNervey, 112 Conn. 421, 152 At. 399 (1930); Weavil v. Myers,
243 N. C. 386, 90 S.E.2d 733 (1956).
9. The majority opinion cites only one case (Cardelli v. Simon, 149 Pa. Super 364,
27 A.2d 250 (1942)) which denies the need for a proximate causal relationship in
finding contributory negligence, and it relies chiefly on a number of cases which simply
reiterate the test as being "whether the plaintiff's negligence contributed in any degree
to the resulting injury," but makes it clear that, whatever these cases meant, proximate
cause is no longer an element of contributory negligence.
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negligence and his injury is excluded. Actual causation then becomes the
only pertinent area of causal inquiry, and whether this is desirable is ques-
tionable. 10 There appears to be no sound basis for a distinction between
the causal relation needed in the defense of contributory negligence and
that needed to establish a defendant's negligence." To hold in the same
case that the defendant is not liable unless his negligence was a proximate
cause and that the plaintiff cannot recover if his negligence contributed in
any degree, however slight, appears to be an unjustified difference in treat-
ment. 12  Proximate cause, although a subject of much confusion,' 8 is
basically a limiting principle which removes from consideration those re-
mote causes which are of no legal consequences. It follows that to remove
this limiting element of proximate causality in contributory negligence im-
plies an intent to expand the meaning of contributory negligence so as to
more often bar recovery. The harsh results which might logically follow
have been avoided by two practices. First, the courts have been reluctant
to rule as a matter of law that a sufficient causal connection does exist.'
4
Second, as a result juries have been-left to interpret and apply this test, and
as a practical matter refuse to carry refined notions of causality so far as to
bar a plaintiff's recovery.' 5 The present decision may effect these two
practices since it makes unmistakably clear the slight causal connection
needed for a jury to find contributory negligence, and thus exerts added
pressure on trial courts to rule as a matter of law on the sufficiency of the
causal connection. At the same time the instant decision precludes any
consideration by the jury of reasonable limitations on causality. It cannot
be denied that the result of the instant case will strengthen the defense of
contributory negligence in Pennsylvania. Whether the extension of the
defense is desirable is certainly questionable.' 6
Gerald R. Stockman
10. The Pennsylvania test contains the. confusing phrase, "contributes in any
degree," which obviously refers to actual causation while proximate cause is not, strictly
speaking, a test of causation at all but rather a test of legal liability. A better statement
of the rule appears in the case of Oil City Fuel Supply Co. v. Boundy, 122 Pa. 449,
15 Atl. 865 (1888) which the majority opinion itself cites. The court in that case states
the rule to be, "any degree of negligence on the part of the plaintiff contributing to
his injury destroys his right of recovery." Here the emphasis is put on the degree of
negligence rather than on the causal element.
11. Smernoff v. McNervey, 112 Conn. 421, 152 At. 399 (1930) ; See also HARPER
AND JAMEs, THE LAW OF TORTS § 22.2, at 1199-200 (1956).
12. The only justification would be a policy favoring the extension of the doctrine
of contributory negligence and the desirability of this is far from obvious. See O'TooLE,
Comparative Negligence: The Pennsylvania Proposal, 2 VIiL. L. REv. 474 (1957).
13. Mahoney v. Beatman, 110 Conn. 184, 147 Atl. 762 (1929) ; HARPER AND JAMES,
THE LAW OF TORTS § 22.10.
14. See PROSSER, TORTS § 50 (2d ed. 1955); GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE
CAUSE § 5 (1927). The present case is an example of this reluctance. Assuming that the
plaintiffs were negligent in leaving their motorcycles on the paved portion of the high-
way, it does not appear that reasonable men could find that it did not "contribute in any
degree to the resulting injury."
15. HARPER AND JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 22.10 n. 8,9 (1956).
16. See note 12 supra.
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TORTS-IMMUNITY OF CHARITABLE HOSPITALS FOR NEGLIGENCE OF
EMPLOYEES-RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR.
Bing v. Thunig (N. Y. 1957).
Plaintiff was burned during an operation performed by her own physi-
cian at St. John's Episcopal Hospital, a non-profit institution. Prior to
the operation, nurses employed by the hospital applied inflammable anti-
septic to the plaintiff's back and were instructed to remove any of the
sheets underneath plaintiff upon which the antiseptic spilled. The nurses
did not inspect the sheets though aware of the inflammable nature of the
antiseptic and plaintiff was burned during the operation when the sheets
ignited while the physician was applying a heated electric cautery. Plaintiff
brought this action against the physician and the hospital and received judg-
ment against both, the supreme court charging that plaintiff could recover
against the hospital only if the injury occurred through the negligence of one
of its employees while performing an administrative and not a medical act.
Upon appeal, the appellate division reversed, the majority reasoning that
because the application of the antiseptic was in preparation for the operation
and, therefore, part of the operation itself, the injury occurred during per-
formance of a medical act. The court of appeals in reversing the decision of
the appellate division held that the doctrine according to the hospital an
immunity for the negligence of its professional employees while perform-
ing medical acts, should be abandoned, and granted a new trial. Bing v.
Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1957). 1
The general doctrine of immunity of hospitals from liability for injury
due to the negligence of doctors, nurses, and other members of the med-
ical profession in their general employ has recently been the subject of
critical review in jurisdictions already committed to its enforcement and by
courts being asked to adopt the rule for the first time.2 In New York,
prior to this case, the doctrine applied to both public charitable hospitals
and private hospitals, whether profit-making or not.8 The question of the
application of the doctrine has arisen primarily in those cases where
the negligent act was performed by a doctor, nurse, or intern, and the
party plaintiff was the beneficiary of the medical services and facilities
of the hospital.4 It was well settled in New York prior to this case,
1. Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 163 N.Y.S. 2d 3 (1957).
2. For cases in jurisdictions committed to the enforcement of the doctrine see,
e.g., Ray v. Tucson Medical Center, 72 Ariz. 22, 230 P.2d 220 (1951); Wheat v.
Idaho Falls Latter Day Saints Hospital, 297 P.2d 1041 (Idaho 1956); Haynes v.
Presbyterian Hospital Ass'n, 241 Iowa 1269, 45 N.W.2d 151 (1950); Pierce v.
Yakima Valley Memorial Hospital Ass'n, 43 Wash. 2d 162, 260 P.2d 765 (1953).
For cases in jurisdictions asked to adopt the doctrine for the first time see, e.g.,
Durney v. St. Francis Hospital, 46 Del. 350, 83 A.2d 753 (1951); Waynick v.
Reardon, 236 N.C. 116, 72 S.E.2d 4 (1952); Rickbeil v. Grafton Deaconess Hospital,
74 N.D. 525, 23 N.W.2d 247 (1946) ; Hansch v. Hackett, 190 Wash. 97, 66 P.2d 1129
(1937).
3. Dillon v. Rockaway Beach Hospital, 283 N.Y. 176, 30 N.E.2d 273 (1940).
4. Powers v. Mass. Homeopathic Hospital, 109 Fed. 294 (1st Cir. 1901).
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that hospitals, charitable or not, were liable to a stranger for injuries in-
curred due to the negligence of the hospital or those in its general employ.'
The hospital was also liable if it was negligent in the performance of a duty
owing to its employees.6 The general rule in New York exempting hos-
pitals from liability to beneficiaries for injuries caused by the negligent acts
of its general employees was first enunciated in Schloendorff v. New York
Hospital,7 which held that hospitals when maintained as charitable institu-
tions were not liable to patients for the injuries caused by the negligence of
physicians and nurses. The rule was qualified to exempt the hospital from
liability only where the negligent act performed was in the course of medi-
cal treatment and not during an administrative act.8 The nature of the act
thus became controlling, rather than the skill of the person performing it. 9
Expressly excluded from the purview of the doctrine, however, were all
non-professional employees of the hospital, no matter what the nature of
the act they performed which caused the injury.1 The scope of the appli-
cation of the doctrine was thus limited to cases where the nature of the
act which caused the injury was part of the medical treatment of the benefi-
ciary-patient,11 and the act was performed by a doctor, nurse, intern, or
other professional employee of the hospital.1 2  The Schloendorff case also
settled the question in the affirmative as to whether acts of preparation im-
mediately preceding the operation and necessary to its successful perform-
ance, were acts of medical treatment. 13 Most jurisdictions which have
chosen to adopt the doctrine have not seen fit to extend its application to
private non-charitable hospitals as was done in New York.14 In those juris-
dictions, in which a narrow view of the doctrine of respondeat superior is
5. Gartland v. New York Zoological Society, 61 Misc. 643 (1909). Charitable
hospitals are immune from such claims in Pennsylvania, however. Bond v. Pitts-
burgh, 368 Pa. 404, 84 A.2d 328 (1951).
6. Hordern v. Salvation Army, 199 N.Y. 233, 92 N.E. 626 (1910). Such is
probably the law in Pennsylvania also. See Winnemore v. Philadelphia, 18 Pa.
Super. 625 (1902).
7. 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914).
8. Phillips v. Buffalo General Hospital, 239 N.Y. 188, 146 N.E. 199 (1924).
9. Ibid.
10. Sheehan v. North Country Community Hospital, 273 N.Y. 163, 7 N.E.2d 28
(1937).
11. Mrachek v. Sunshine Biscuit, 308 N.Y. 112, 123 N.E.2d 801 (1954).
12. Adams v. University Hospital, 122 Mo. App. 675, 99 S.W. 453 (1907). Injurisdictions where the doctrine is limited in its application to charitable hospitals
only, the fact that the beneficiary has paid for the services usually has no bearing on
the determination of the application of the doctrine. A fortiori, the paying status of
the beneficiary was not determining in New York. It should also be noted that no
distinction was made between visiting physicians and house physicians, or nurses and
internes working under them.
13. Schloendorff v. New York Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914).
14. See Bakal v. University Heights Sanitarium, 277 App. Div. 572, 101 N.Y.S.2d
385 (1st Dep't 1950), aff'd without opinion, 302 N.Y. 870, 100 N.E.2d 51 (1951).
New York has excepted by statute, all state-maintained hospitals from the purview
of the doctrine. N.Y. CT. CL. ACT, § 8; N.Y. LAWS 1937, c. 483, § 50(d), as amended
by N.Y. LAWS 1950, c. 681.
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the only basis for immunity, hospitals are held liable for acts of their profes-
claims arising from the negligence of its agents, though supported by some
jurisdictions in granting total immunity to all charitable institutions,',
sional employees no matter what the nature of the act they performed, if it is
shown that the hospital was negligent in selecting the employees. 15
The theory that the public and private donations received by the chari-
table hospital constitute a trust fund which can not be despoiled by tort
has been expressly rejected in New York,17 as has the doctrine of implied
waiver.'8 In New York, the immunity of hospitals from tort claims for
negligence of their professional employees while performing medical acts
was predicated on the theory that as between the hospital and its profes-
sional employees, the doctrine of respondeat superior did not apply when
the professional employee was engaged in a medical act because of the hos-
pital's inability of controlling the actions of one performing such an opera-
tion. 19 The instant case, in finally disposing of the Schloendorif rule, ex-
pressly rejects this theory. Though defendant here was a charitable hos-
pital, this decision more than likely will be controlling in disposing of the
doctrine as it is applied to private non-charitable hospitals in New York.20
Not so clear, however, is the impact which the abandonment of the Schloen-
dorif rule will have on other charitable institutions in New York. The
15. See Bryant v. Presbyterian Hospital, 304 N.Y. 538, 110 N.E.2d 391 (1953).
The burden of showing such negligence is on the plaintiff, the standard of care being
an appropriate investigation by the hospital into the background of the employee.
16. Downes v. Harper Hospital, 101 Mich. 555, 559, 60 N.W. 42, 43 (1894).
The court said: "By permitting a recovery, the trust fund might be entirely destroyed
and diverted from the purpose for which the donor gave it. Charitable bequests can-
not be thus thwarted by. the negligence for which the donor is in no way responsible
Those voluntarily accepting the benefit of a charity accept it upon this con-
dition." In Pennsylvania, because of the application of this theory, only charitable
hospitals are exempted from liability, and the doctrine of respondeat superior has been
found to be applicable as between the hospital and its employees even while perform-
ing a medical act. See Brown v. Moore, 247 F.2d 711 (3d Cir. 1957); Gable v.
Sisters of St. Francis, 227 Pa. 254, 75 A. 1087 (1910). The fact that the trust fund
theory also supports the tort immunity of other charitable institutions in Pennsylvania
would seem to preclude the abandonment of the tort immunity of charitable hospitals
in the near future, except by legislation. See Bond v. Pittsburgh, 368 Pa. 404, 407,
408, 84 A.2d 328 (1951).
17. "The doctrine that the will of, an individual shall exempt either person
or property from the operation of general laws is inconsistent with the funda-
mental idea of government. It permits the will of the subject to nullify the will
of the people." Hordern v. Salvation Army, 199 N.Y. 233, 239, 92 N.E. 626, 628
(1910) referring to the trust fund theory.
18. Sheehan v. North Country Community Hospital, 273 N.Y. 163, 166, 7 N.E.2d
28, 29 (1937). The court rejected the doctrine which -was based on the hypothesis
that a recipient of the benefit impliedly waives any claim for damages for torts arising
from the administration of a charity.
19. Phillips v. Buffalo General Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914).
20. The same theory is applied in New York in granting immunity from tort claims
to private non-charitable hospitals, as is applied in granting immunity to charitable
hospitals. See Bakal v. University Heights Sanitarium, 277 App. Div. 572, 101
N.Y.S.2d 385 (1st Dep't 1950), aff'd without opinion, 302 N.Y. 870, 100 N.E.2d 51
(1951).
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spirit of the Schloendorff rule was clearly to protect a necessary charity,2 '
and while the court in the instant case rejects the method presently used in
accomplishing that protection, it leaves the efficacy of the motivating spirit
unimpaired. The majority opinion indicates that a primary reason for the
abandonment of the rule is that the reason for the motivating spirit behind it
no longer exists, 22 since hospitals today are a stable part of the community
and have the means to protect themselves against such tort claims.2- The
effect of the instant case on other charitable institutions will most likely
depend on how closely the motive in keeping them immune from liability
parallels'the motive for the adoption of the Schloendorff rule. The remain-
ing tort immunity of private charitable universities, which is based on the
same theory as the tort immunity of hospitals, is, in all probability, at an
end.24  Other jurisdictions which base the rule of immunity of charitable
hospitals from tort liability on the same theory as the Schloendorff rule, have
found more difficulty in abandoning the doctrine because of its application
to other charitable institutions. 25 Those jurisdictions, however, have taken
a more practical view of the reason for the non-applicability of respondeat
superior.26  In place of the discarded doctrine, the courts in New York
might be expected to apply a test similar to the one applied in England,
27
which would predicate liability of the hospital on whether the negligent
employees were performing their duties under a contract for service, or of
service.
Peter P. Smith III.
21. "A ruling would indeed be an unfortunate one that might constrain charitable
institutions, as a means of self-protection, to limit their activities .... ." Schloendorff
v. New York Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125, 135, 105 N.E. 92, 95 (1914).
22. Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3, 9 (1957).
23. For a discussion of hospital liability insurance, see, REUSCHLEIN, THE
HOSPITAL AS INSURED, in PAPERS PRESENTED AT INSTITUTE ON HOSPITAL LAW
IN PENNSYLVANIA 28 (1956).
24. Hamburger v. Cornell University, 240 N.Y. 328, 148 N.E. 539 (1925). The
court adopted the theory of the Schloendorff rule in holding a private university not
liable for the torts of its professors.
25. McDermott v. St. Mary's Hospital Corp., 133 A.2d 608 (Conn. 1957) ; Dille v.
St. Luke's Hospital, 355 Mo. 436, 196 S.W.2d 615 (1946). In the latter case, the
theory of the non-applicability of respondeat superior as between the hospital and its
employees while performing medical acts is encompassed in the court's conception of
"public policy." See also Whittaker v. St. Luke's Hospital, 137 Mo. App. 116, 117
S.W. 1189, 1190 (1909). In the McDermott case, the Connecticut court expressly
refused to follow the instant case because it would involve the tort immunity of other
charitable institutions.
26. Commenting on the basis for the exemption of charitable hospitals from tort
immunity, the Connecticut court said: "It is perhaps immaterial whether we say the
public policy which supports the doctrine of respondeat superior does not justify such
extension of the rule, or say that the public policy which encourages enterprises for
charitable purposes requires an exemption from. the operation of the rule based on
legal fiction, and which as applied to owners of such enterprises, is clearly opposed
to substantial justice." Hearns v. Waterbury Hospital, 66 Conn. 68, 33 A. 595, 604(1885).
27. Collins v. Hertfordshire County Council, 1 All Eng. Rep. 633 (1947).
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